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Abstract
Starting in late May 1939, a humanitarian crisis developed when some 900 Ger-
man Jews were denied the use of prearranged Cuban temporary immigration per-
mits in the port of Havana after having arrived on board of the MS St. Louis, a 
luxury German liner. The event soon attracted much media attention because of its 
dramatic character and negotiations immediately began to find a safe haven for 
the stranded passengers elsewhere on the Atlantic seacoast. Eventually, after a few 
days, all efforts in this respect failed and the captain of the MS St. Louis, Gustav 
Schröder, was forced to contemplate bringing his human cargo back to Western 
Europe where four countries allowed the passengers to disembark. This article dis-
cusses the involvement of the Canadian government and media in this crisis, and 
the role that the Mackenzie-King cabinet played in denying the German Jewish 
refugees any hope of being welcomed in the country. Of particular interest here is 
the fact that the Canadian public was not well informed of the fate of the St. Louis 
passengers, in either official language, and that largely for this reason no serious 
pressure was put on the government to bring a different resolution of the crisis. 
Résumé
À la fin du mois de mai 1939, une crise humanitaire est apparue quand quelque 
900 Juifs allemands, arrivés à bord du paquebot le Saint-Louis, n’ont pu bénéficier 
dans le port de La Havane de permis d’immigration temporaires cubains déjà émis. 
L’événement n’a pas tardé à attirer beaucoup d’attention de la part des médias par 
son côté dramatique et des négociations ont immédiatement été lancées afin de trou-
ver sur la côte atlantique un autre port d’accueil pour les réfugiés apatrides. Après 
quelques jours, le capitaine du navire, Gustav Schröder a toutefois dû se résoudre à 
regagner l’Europe de l’Ouest, où quatre pays ont accepté de prendre en charge les 
passagers. Cet article s’intéresse au rôle joué par le gouvernement et par les médias 
canadiens dans cette crise, et en particulier au fait qu’aucun geste concret n’ait été 
fait pour accueillir les réfugiés juifs au pays. L’auteur porte une attention spéciale 
au fait que le sort des passagers du Saint-Louis n’ait pas fait l’objet de reportages 
dans les journaux canadiens, dans aucune des langues officielles, et que pour cette 
raison le cabinet de Mackenzie-King a senti peu de pression de la part des citoyens 
canadiens pour trouver une résolution différente à la crise.
In November 2018, the Trudeau government officially offered an apology to the Jew-
ish community of Canada, and more particularly to the Jewish refugees seeking a 
haven in the country in the period before, during, and immediately after the Second 
World War. This declaration made in the House of Commons specifically addressed 
the issue of the failure of Mackenzie King’s cabinet to open the gates of Canada to 
individuals forced to leave their home in the face of mounting antisemitism, racism 
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and political violence; first in Germany after 1933 and then in Nazi occupied regions 
of Europe from 1939 to 1945. Of particular importance in this public statement of 
contrition was the St. Louis liner incident of June 1939, when more than 900 German 
Jewish refugees were denied temporary entrance visas in Cuba and were forced to 
return to Europe when the United States and Canada refused to issue special per-
mits to allow them to land on their shores. In the last twenty years or so, the event 
has caught the imagination of the Canadian public and has been invested with a 
particularly intense emotional charge. As is often the case with historical issues that 
have a tragic character and are viewed retrospectively with a sense of indignation, 
much remains to be done to shed light on the actual events that took place and to 
separate myth from reality. This article is an attempt at enlarging our knowledge 
of the St. Louis affair and better situate the episode in the much larger context of 
Canadian Immigration history in the early part of the twentieth century. Another 
key question in this respect, but of a very different nature, is to what extent was the 
Canadian public exposed to the momentous circumstances when, in June 1939, the St. 
Louis liner was refused entrance in the port of Havana, and how were the events rep-
resented in the Canadian press published in both English and French. It should be 
noted that no serious or valid research has been conducted up to now with regards to 
the attitude of French Canadian newspapers or readership in general on this episode.
The fate of the St. Louis passengers, as seen from a Canadian perspective, was not only 
the result of immediate pressures and political decisions made on the spur of the 
moment as the tragedy was unfolding hour by hour in the port of Havana and later 
on the Florida coast. Much of the blame for this disinterest or indifference at the 
time is judged today to rest squarely with members of Parliament, who had the pow-
er to issue orders in council and to decisively intervene at strategic junctures; or with 
civil servants who continued to apply insensitively standard rules and regulations 
in moments of pressing urgency. Although there is some truth in these statements, 
they tend to overlook a much longer sequence of Canadian immigration policies that 
came to bear on the events of June 1939, and which must be factored in the timeline 
if a broader picture of the St. Louis tragedy is to emerge. The result of these arrange-
ments and administrative practices, often conceived as early as 1910, 1919, and 1923, 
in periods of relative calm on the world scene, proved devastating when totalitarian 
right-wing regimes became dominant in the thirties in many European countries 
and the number of people in distress skyrocketed.1 To add to the complexity of the 
situation, the Canadian government imposed in 1923 severe prohibitions against im-
migrants that were not bona fide farmers or farm labourers, effectively shutting 
down access to the country to most individuals who came from urban milieus and 
practiced trades and professions incompatible with a rural way of life.2 When Ger-
man and Czechoslovakian Jews attempted to enter Canada in the late thirties in large 
numbers, they confronted regulations that had been in force for at least fifteen years 
and had remained unchanged since.
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Even more troubling were the conditions imposed administratively at that time by 
the Department of Immigration to steamship companies, and not stated in the 1923 
order in council. At some point in the thirties, without much public discussion, if any 
at all, the government of Canada took to classifying candidates for admission to the 
country into three groups: preferred, non-preferred and special permit immigrants. 
When describing these distinctions in his 1939 study entitled Canada’s Jews, Louis 
Rosenberg, a demographer working in conjunction with Canadian Jewish Congress, 
stressed that they were based “upon ‘racial’ theories similar in many respect to those 
subsequently adopted by Hitler and his Nazi party”.3 By “preferred” the Canadian 
government meant newcomers whose “racial characteristics” were close to those of 
the inhabitants of the British Isles, and whose ability to assimilate into the main 
body of Canadian society were deemed high, such as individuals originating from 
the Northern and Western regions of Europe. “Non-preferred” immigrants, not to 
be given priority in the selection process leading to admittance to Canada, included 
individuals living in the regions of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire, in Poland, 
Rumania and the Baltic states, and in former regions of Russia not under the direct 
control of the Soviet Union. Finally, the “special permit” category required the issu-
ance by the Department of Immigration, to candidates in that group, on a personal 
basis and after a thorough examination, of official documents stating their suitability 
for immigration to Canada. Among those affected by these far more stringent mea-
sure were immigrants of Greek, Italian, Armenian, Syrian, Bulgarian and Turkish 
origins, plus Jews of Polish, Rumanian, Russian and Lithuanian origins. These lia-
bilities, not mentioned in the 1910 and 1919 Canadian laws on immigration, could be 
expanded at any moment after 1923 to include all Jews, regardless of nationality or 
country of residence, except for British and American Jews. Such permits, Rosenberg 
reminded his readers in 1939: “Were very difficult to obtain and were usually granted 
only to the parents, wives and minor children of persons already resident of Canada”.4 
Africans and Asians were simply judged in this respect to be “unsuited to the climate 
or requirements of Canada”.5
These administrative regulations, not being subsumed under the broader category 
of “acts of Parliament”, could be modified at the discretion of the minister and with-
out the changes having to be made known to a wider public or even beyond a limited 
circle of civil servants. They were also not published in Canadian offices abroad or 
explained clearly to prospective immigrants who applied for admittance to Canada 
as permanent residents. For this reason, it remains very difficult for the historian of 
immigration to speculate under which circumstances or context these permits were 
delivered to “special categories” candidates. Regulatory decisions made in the early 
twenties, or even earlier, according to perceptions then current, may have remained 
in the books for long periods, regardless of the shifting nature of immigrant flows, 
the sudden political transformations brought to certain countries in Europe by war 
or revolution, or even the fluctuating fortunes of the Canadian economy. Even the 
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central reasoning behind the 1919 “Act to Amend the Immigration Act”, which made 
it possible to reject certain types of immigrants simply on the assumption that they 
would find it too onerous to adapt to the mores of a British colony, could be inter-
preted in myriad different ways depending on the context of the moment and the 
political sensitivity of a particular minister. In some cases, at times without apparent 
logic, requests were expedited upon the personal intervention of Mackenzie King, 
while other petitions of a similar nature remained unanswered.
Legally, the 1919 Act obliged civil servants and inspectors to prohibit the landing of 
certain classes of candidates “because such immigrants are deemed undesirable ow-
ing to their peculiar customs, habits, modes of life and methods of holding property, 
and because of their probable inability to become readily assimilated or to assume 
the duties and responsibilities of Canadian citizenship within a reasonable time af-
ter their entry”.6 Generally understood to mean people of Asian or African descent, 
these terms were so vague and imprecise, that they could be applied to individuals 
of almost any national, cultural or religious origins that presented themselves at the 
border of Canada, except for persons of British extraction. Exercised in discretionary 
fashion and according to the circumstances prevailing at any given moment, such 
criteria for admission, certainly more than the provisions pertaining to the industri-
al and commercial needs of the country, were amenable to adjustments, modifica-
tions or even sudden redefinitions within a larger framework. The brutal economic 
downturn of the early thirties, which resulted in very high unemployment figures 
in Canada, and the fear of an impending worldwide military conflict at the end of 
this decade, put enormous pressure on the federal government and made renewed 
public acceptance for large immigration flows into the country very unlikely. After 
1929, all the room for manoeuvre that had existed at the time when the 1919 and 1923 
regulations were passed had essentially dissipated.
Starting in the early thirties, the overall number of immigrants admitted to Canada 
took such a dramatic plunge, that the prospective newcomers classified in the least 
desirable categories by the Department of Immigration literally ceased to be con-
sidered. From 166,800 a year in 1928, the number of new residents plummeted to 
37,500 in 1931 and then to 14,400 in 1933, this without any consideration being given 
specifically to Jewish candidates. For the next twelve years, including for the duration 
of the Second World War, Canada’s average intake of new population remained on 
average about 12,000 a year, or a mere 1,000 new arrivals per month.7 This radical 
and sudden flattening of the immigration flow meant that the minister responsible, 
and his highest-ranking civil servants, would consider only candidates most likely 
to conform to the generally accepted view of “immigrant desirability”, and reject 
individuals who did not strictly reflect the ideal presented in the 1919 act and ad-
ministrative guidelines already in existence. Since no serious study of the profile 
of immigrants accepted in the country during the period of 1933 to 1945 has been 
18
Pierre Anctil and Alexandre Comeau / 
The St. Louis Crisis in the Canadian Press: New Data on the June 1939 Incident
undertaken in any detail, we can hypothesize that this is most probably the direction 
that the selection process took during this tense period, with the exception of in-
dividuals who could obtain order in council decisions for themselves after applying 
sufficient political pressure. Given that the entire edifice of Canadian immigration 
was being drastically reduced in the mid-thirties to a mere shadow of its former self, 
it should come as little surprise that the number of Jewish immigrants would at least 
suffer a comparable blow. While 3,848 persons of Jewish origins were being admitted 
to the country in 1928, the figure for 1931 was down to 649. For the rest of the thirties, 
Canada would admit on average six to seven hundred Jews per year, and even fewer 
when large European Jewish communities fell prey to Nazi occupation.8
Much has been made, and rightly so, of the very low level of Jewish immigration to 
Canada in the crucial years when admittance or denial of entry were issues of life 
and death for European refugees seeking a safe haven from persecution. This was 
particularly the case during the highly tragic interval between Kristallnacht and the 
first few weeks of the invasion of Poland. In this context, the Mackenzie King cabinet 
and the officials in charge of administering the Department of Immigration showed 
a great deal of insensitivity to the sufferings of stateless immigrants – Jewish or 
not – and refused to suspend or even briefly modify those regulations in place since 
the early twenties. The demographic figures for Jews presented above must also be 
understood in light of the general trends affecting the processing of all individuals 
seeking entrance into Canada at that time, a factor to which not enough attention 
has been given. The overall percentage of Jews relative to the total immigrant flow 
being let into the country remained stable at approximately 3 to 4% between 1923 to 
1934. After that period, the proportion of Jews allowed into the country even began 
to climb steadily, reaching between 5 to 6 % during the years 1935 to 1939. According 
to the figures presented by Joseph Kage in his 1962 book, With Faith and Thanksgiving, 
10% of the immigrants entering Canada in 1940 were of Jewish origins, an all-time 
high for the first half of the twentieth century.9 That year, a further 2,000 German 
Jews rounded up in Great Britain as “enemy aliens” were accepted in Canada as war 
prisoners, but not accounted for as legal immigrants.10 At the same time, an equiva-
lent number probably crossed the border coming from the United States. As Justin 
Comartin has argued convincingly in his M.A. thesis, it is not so much the absolute 
numbers of Jews entering the ports of the country that is of significance, but their 
relative proportion to the total movement of newcomers, a statistical principal not 
necessarily well understood by all authors who approached this subject.11
If Canada did very little indeed to offer a refuge to the Jewish victims of Nazism, it 
also kept all admissions from all countries and touching all nationalities to a very 
bare minimum during at least a ten-year period before the Second World War. If the 
government must be faulted, it should also be censured for systematically refusing 
to extend a friendly hand to immigrants in general and essentially for bringing to a 
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grinding halt during an entire decade all movement into the country on the part of 
foreign citizens. The legal and administrative instruments to achieve these results 
did not have to be created or even discussed in public, since they already existed in 
the form of official acts of parliament passed shortly before and after the First World 
War. Regulations detailing the permeability of the maritime border of Canada with 
Europe had been in place since 1923, and only needed to be enforced more strenu-
ously than in earlier periods. Had Mackenzie King’s cabinet been more generous in 
its conception of immigrant admission overall after the onset of the great depression, 
and had greater numbers of newcomers regularly entered the country during the 
thirties, perhaps Canadian Jewish Congress and other refugee lobbying organiza-
tions might have had more success in convincing Ottawa to do more in favor of the 
European victims of Nazi persecution. As it was, the approach of the government 
was already well entrenched by the late thirties and had borne clearly racial over-
tones since at least the turn of the century, if not before.12 
These features of Canada’s immigration policy appeared so deeply rooted in the 
country’s history that no amount of pleading could alter them, not even the dra-
matic context emerging in Germany in the late thirties. In fact, the ideological and 
cultural origins of Canada’s attitude to migration flows is probably to be found in 
conceptions developed by Great Britain about the long-term evolution of its em-
pire and particularly notions about “White Dominions” as places reserved for British 
colonial settlement. When Canada won a measure of political independence from 
the mother country, in the late nineteenth century, these notions of racial purity 
were simply reinterpreted in national terms and slightly altered to meet the less 
racialized context of the day.13 It should come as no surprise therefore, that Jewish 
calls for humanitarian gestures on the part of Canada fell on deaf ears. Even pressing 
appeals made by mainstream advocates of refugee admission went unheeded until 
the very end, which is when Canada declared war on Germany in September 1939. 
If Canadians with British origins could not affect a change of attitude on the part of 
the federal government, it was very unlikely that Canadians recently immigrated in 
the country, and described by official documents as “non-preferred” individuals, for 
lack of a more insulting term, would sway the Mackenzie King cabinet. What Canada 
had conceived of very early in the twentieth century as a sound immigration policy, 
was not about to be modified by political events taking place after 1933 in a faraway 
country and affecting a religious minority ranking not particularly high on the scale 
of desirability. The racialist approach used in judging prospective newcomers to the 
country, and the very high obstacles erected by Canadian authorities on the road to 
admission and acceptance, such as the infamous clause prohibiting “the landing in 
Canada or at any specified port of entry in Canada of any immigrant who has come 
to Canada otherwise than by continuous journey from the country of which he is a 
native or naturalized citizen”, remained constant features of Ottawa’s immigration 
policy during long periods.14 Such a deep-seated perspective on the part of Canadian 
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authorities would prove very resistant to change, especially in the middle of a world-
wide economic crisis and at a time when the fear of communism loomed large in the 
xenophobic attitudes directed to the European continent. 
Considering Canadian attitudes toward immigrants brings to the fore the question 
of how much the general population of the country actually knew about the plight of 
refugees from Nazism before the beginning of the Second World War, and particu-
larly about the persecution of Jews in Germany before Kristallnacht.15 This question 
is crucial to understanding the professed attitude of indifference manifested by the 
Liberal cabinet in Ottawa, notably since the Prime Minister and his close politi-
cal allies were very sensitive to public opinion, both Anglophone and Francophone. 
Canadian political leaders would surely have become more concerned with the suf-
ferings of stateless immigrants, had a groundswell of sympathy manifested itself in 
their favor among large segments of the Canadian population. In their seminal study 
entitled None is Too Many, Harold Troper and Irving Abella place the blame for the 
inattention to Jewish requests for more admissions in several places, including the 
perceived lack of responsiveness on the part of the general public as the situation of 
German Jews grew increasingly desperate after Kristallnacht. The authors advance a 
series of reasons explaining the seemingly deep unconcern of Canadians, which they 
list at the end of the second chapter of their study: “Thus the unyielding opposition 
of certain key officials, the depression, the general apathy in English Canada, the 
outright hostility of French Canada, the Prime Minister’s concern for votes and the 
overlay of antisemitism that dominated official Ottawa combined to insure that no 
more than a mere handful of Jewish refugees would find a home in Canada”.16 The 
problem remains that Abella and Troper’s treatment of French language sources 
was very superficial, producing distortions in methodology and interpretation that 
are also perceptible in L. Ruth Klein’s book on the St. Louis tragedy, particularly in 
Amanda Grzyb’s chapter on the press reaction; a weakness in the analysis of the St. 
Louis episode that this article will attempt to remedy.17
In modern liberal democracies, such as Canada, apathy or ignorance of a pressing 
issue on the part of citizens is generally no longer a product of illiteracy or lack of 
readily available public channels of information. Most likely, average Canadians who 
remained aloof to certain political causes or events unfolding in the arena of inter-
national relations, such as the Nazi persecution of Jews or other perceived enemies 
of the German people, were reacting to a much broader context of disinterest on the 
part of the press, political commentators and members of parliament. To substanti-
ate such a claim of indifference on the part of the general public to certain key issues, 
and to explain the reasons for this apparent blindness, historians have the option of 
resorting to a systematic study of newspapers published in both official languages 
in the country and to numerous sources readily available to the contemporary re-
searcher. With regards to the treatment of refugee demands for admittance to the 
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country at the time of the Kristallnacht pogrom, the fundamental question remains, 
still unanswered in large part: were Canadians fundamentally unconcerned, were 
they poorly informed of the situation, or simply uninformed? Historians must also 
examine seriously in this respect the issue of the existence in Canada of two official 
languages and consider the respective sensibilities of Anglophone and Francophone 
readers. Very likely, I would hypothesize, little substantial evidence reached Canadi-
ans before the middle of 1938 about the rapidly degrading position of Jews in Ger-
many. The situation would begin to change only when newspapers everywhere in the 
world reported in November of that year images of synagogues burning in almost 
every city under the control of the Nazi Party. 
In this respect, decisions made by the Nazis in Germany against Jews and other mi-
norities throughout the mid-thirties, such as the Nuremberg laws of 1935 and the 
measures destined to curb a so-called Jewish influence in the civil service, the press, 
and the arts, probably did not for the most part reach mainstream Canadians. It is not 
so much that these decisions on the part of the National Socialist German Workers’ 
Party (NSDAP) went unreported in the country, but that they were presented in an 
inconsistent and erratic way in the Canadian press. Rarely before Kristallnacht did 
editorialists or political observers in Canada paint a broad picture of the policies of 
the Third Reich with regards to “racial minorities”, relegating most of the meager 
information on this subject to back pages and small size press releases.18 Most of the 
journalists and editorialists working in Canada, in both official languages, did not 
have a pronounced interest in Germany’s internal affairs and few took to describing 
during the thirties the long-term policies of the Nazi State concerning its Jew-
ish citizens and other religious minorities. It certainly did not help that the Prime 
Minister of Canada, William Lyon Mackenzie King, made an official visit to Berlin in 
June 1937, giving the German government an aura of legitimacy on the international 
scene and meeting Hitler in person to discuss peace in Europe and throughout the 
world.19 Upon seeing the head of their country in direct contact with high-ranking 
Nazi officials, and being offered a much-publicized tour of Berlin festooned with 
Nazi symbols, many Canadians must have felt that there existed no reason to oppose 
or to condemn the Third Reich from the point of view of diplomatic ties or gov-
ernment-to-government relations. Clearly, whatever the Canadian Jewish Congress 
and other activists within the Jewish community found objectionable to Nazism 
produced little echo in Ottawa or in the mainstream press of the country before late 
in the thirties. 
My main working hypothesis in this respect is that, during the thirties, there emerged 
a negative consensus in the French and English language press of Canada regarding 
the issue of immigration, although not borne by a common understanding of the 
phenomenon at hand.20 Francophone editorialists tended to generally oppose the 
incoming of migrants on the ground that it marginalized further French Canadians 
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in the federation, and generally comprised individuals who could not be convinced 
to join the rural and traditionalist Catholic ideology defended by this group’s elites. 
British Canadians, as the immigration policies of the country attests clearly, tended 
to view newcomers from a perspective of racial purity and sought to reject those 
not of Northern European and Protestant origins. Likewise, both official language 
newspapers viewed Jews, and particularly German Jewish immigrants with a great 
deal of suspicion, but again not exactly for the same reasons. Catholic Francophone 
antisemitism did not have the same basic references as its Anglican equivalent in the 
British realm, and relied on authors and commentators unknown to English speak-
ers, such as Édouard Drumont, abbé Maximilien de Lamarque, Léon Daudet and 
Charles Maurras. It should also be noted that, except for the marginal and often 
ephemeral press organs animated by Adrien Arcand during the thirties, important 
French Canadian dailies did not harbor very radical negative notions of Jews and 
tended to voice relatively moderate and often inconsistent forms of antisemitism. 
Until the severe depredations brought against German religious minorities in late 
1938, Le Devoir, among others, did not dwell at length of the situation of Jews in Cen-
tral Europe and had no definitive opinion on their possible immigration to Canada.
Recent research that I conducted in two leading socially conservative Francophone 
newspapers of Canada point in this direction.21 Between January 1933 and Septem-
ber 1939, Le Devoir published 35 substantial editorials on the political situation in 
Germany, on Hitler and on Nazism, 77% of which appeared after January 1937 over 
a period of 33 months.22 Of particular interest in this sequence was a series of eight 
editorials written in December 1937 by Georges Pelletier, the director of Le Devoir, 
while touring Germany and other European countries. If we take into account this 
detailed portrait of the political situation in central Europe published very late in 
1937, the bulk of Le Devoir’s reflections on Hitlerism actually began to appear only 
starting in the second half of 1937. A similar trend is visible in Le Devoir’s treatment 
of Jewish sufferings in the Third Reich and the possible outmigration of Jewish ref-
ugees from Germany. Of 11 major editorials dedicated specifically to this subject, 8 
appeared in 1938-1939, or 82% of the total, with a strong concentration immediately 
before and after the pogrom of Kristallnacht. While in Germany in late 1937, Pelletier 
took a dim view of the NSDAP regime and denounced in particular the absence of a 
free press in the country and the general suppression of democratic rights, but paid 
little attention to the persecution of religious minorities and Jews in particular. This 
subject would surface only a few months later when Le Devoir argued in favor of not 
opening the gates of Canada to refugees from central Europe, namely German Jews:
We have our Jews and we do not persecute them. They live happily and in 
wealth, without being repressed. Their presence constitutes one of the multi-
tude of major problems that Canada needs to resolve quietly and without injus-
tice first and foremost to itself. We have enough of our own problems, starting 
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with our Jewish problem. This is not the time to make any of the problems 
worse. The propositions such as those of the Star, and still less that of Mr. de 
Kerillis, who has no business in Canada’s affairs, solve nothing. To listen and 
want to follow up on these propositions – London cannot follow up on them, 
this is Canada’s business alone – would lead to a dead end. The solution to the 
issue lies elsewhere than in the massive migration of German Jews to Canada. 
The issue is really a European one and we old-stock Canadians refuse to suffer 
its consequences.23
A compilation of all the articles, opinions and editorials published on Germany in 
L’Action catholique, between January 1933 and the beginning of the Second World War, 
shows the same trend, mainly that the Quebec City daily began to pay attention to the 
situation unfolding in Nazi Germany quite late in the thirties.24 The turning point 
for L’Action catholique was the Anschluss of March 1938, when very decisive mea-
sures were taken by the German occupying forces against the predominant Catholic 
institutions in Vienna, and not the persecution of Jews in the Third Reich. In 1938 
alone, L’Action catholique offered 343 texts of all types to its readers bearing on Nazi 
Germany, out of a total of 920 for the period mentioned above, or 37% of the total. If 
the output for 1938 and 1939 is regrouped in one statistical category, the proportion 
reaches 44%. It is important to point out as well that by the end of the thirties, most 
of the editorials published in L’Action catholique presented the Nazi regime under a 
very negative light, largely because of the decision made by the NSDAP to suspend 
the freedoms enjoyed previously by the Catholic Church in the country.25 Nonethe-
less, the trend remains that for the large part, the French speaking Canadian public, 
in both Le Devoir and L’Action catholique, received very little information on the sit-
uation in the Reich until it reached a crisis point in international relations and war 
was at hand. At that point, late in the thirties, all eyes were turned to the possibility 
of a new global conflict and the role that French Canada would have to play in this 
confrontation. In this context, very little information was accessible that could sus-
tain a display of sympathy for the oppressed Jewish populations living in the Reich. 
While we have at the moment no conclusive data for the Anglophone Canadian press 
on similar issues for the entire decade of the thirties, it does seem reasonable to 
consider that mainstream English language newspapers in the country likewise did 
not systematically follow in detail, before the pogrom of Kristallnacht, events in Nazi 
Germany relating to Jews.26 The consequence of this negligence or indifference may 
lead us to believe that Canadian readers were not offered over a long period of time 
a full and coherent picture of the antisemitic persecutions taking place in the Third 
Reich before the Second World War, nor credible observations as to the ultimate 
meaning of these developments. Since it is very difficult to ascertain what public 
opinion in Canada, in both official languages, may have felt about the assaults suf-
fered by Jewish communities in Germany, perhaps turning to an incident that took 
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place closer geographically and politically to Ottawa might help shed light on the 
perceptions prevailing in the country just before the declaration of war. The St. Louis 
affair of June 1939 might well be described as one such occurrence of persecution 
likely to attract the attention of Canadians, and perhaps susceptible of offering in the 
large circulation press of the country an occasion to highlight the grave abuses being 
committed in Germany at the time. The episode had clear international repercus-
sions, had attracted the attention of the American press before reaching Canada and 
possessed a dramatic tonality that could easily touch a wide audience. Furthermore, 
contrary to discrimination taking place in the Third Reich, a country that welcomed 
few Canadian press correspondents in the late thirties, the fate of the Jewish passen-
gers on board the St. Louis rested at least in part on decisions made by Prime Minister 
Mackenzie King and his cabinet, or so it seems retrospectively.
If Canadian politicians seemed relatively powerless to change the situation of the 
Jews of Germany, or perhaps even uninterested in discussing the issue with Third 
Reich officials, they could hardly ignore the plight of refugees sailing at some dis-
tance past the country’s main ports on the Atlantic Ocean.27 Still, it should be borne 
in mind that the passengers on board the MS St. Louis of the Hamburg-America 
Line, having departed from Hamburg in the middle of May, were treated rather 
well by the captain of the ship, Gustav Schröder.28 Essentially, they suffered no se-
vere humiliation on board the liner or grave mistreatment, as opposed to many of 
their German coreligionists who were already in Nazi camps or were the object of 
systematic harassment on the streets of German cities. If by all means one sought at 
the time to get a sense of the deep persecutions and radical racial inequity endured 
by the bulk of German Jewry, the St. Louis was certainly not the best place to look. 
In fact, it probably appeared at first sight to Canadians that the fate of the 900 or 
so passengers was rather more endurable than the situation of the majority of Jews 
who remained in the Reich, and whose state of affairs was fast deteriorating in the 
summer of 1939. Providing of course that the Cuba bound travelers could be brought 
to a safe haven somewhere. Canadians, it can be surmised, had only a vague under-
standing of the murderous attitude of the Nazis to Jews living in Germany, and of the 
ignominies imposed on minorities by the theories of Alfred Rosenberg.29 The actual 
departure of the St. Louis from Hamburg, despite the unusual circumstances of the 
voyage, was not initially recorded in newspapers published in Canada, nor were the 
unique circumstances of the temporary Cuban landing permits awarded to almost 
all passengers.
Most probably, on the very eve of the Second World War, and given the very tense in-
ternational situation following the dismembering of Czechoslovakia, Canadians were 
mainly preoccupied with the possibility of being drawn into a new world conflict and 
having to engage in a costly fight once more on the side of Great Britain. Two other 
events overshadowed the refugee crisis unfolding in Cuban waters and along the 
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Atlantic Seaboard starting 30 May and ending 8 June 1939, at least according to the 
timetable provided by most Canadian newspapers.30 One was the accidental sinking 
on 1 June of the HMS Thetis, a new type of submarine that was being tested for the 
first time by the British navy in the shallow waters of Liverpool Bay. During three 
days, news of the event and of the possible rescue of the men still inside occupied the 
front page of most Canadian newspapers, particularly those published in the English 
language, with photographs of the various attempts carried out by a small fleet of 
ships in favor of the trapped sailors. Finally, it was announced on 3 June that all hopes 
of saving the men on board the HMS Thetis had been abandoned, including many 
scientists and shipbuilding experts. In all, 99 lives were lost in the disaster and a con-
siderable emotion was felt throughout the British world at the news of this sudden 
and unpredictable tragedy; all the more since the failed testing of the submarine 
arrived as the country was desperately preparing for a military confrontation with 
Germany. The event reverberated for a few days afterwards as journalists speculated 
on the reason why the HMS Thetis laid motionless at the bottom of the ocean and 
grieving relatives were being interviewed.31
While the attention of the world briefly focused on the disaster that had befallen the 
HMS Thetis, Canada itself was the scene of a much more joyous event. As the refugees 
were departing from Hamburg on board the St. Louis, King George VI and Queen 
Elizabeth were beginning on May 17, in Quebec City, a much-anticipated tour of the 
country. The royal trip was scheduled to end in Halifax on June 15, including a brief 
five-day diplomatic mission to the United States. It was, in Canadian perception, an 
extraordinary occasion since it constituted the first official visit of a reigning mon-
arch to the Dominion, and by all measures remains to this day the longest and most 
publicized. During eighteen days, the King of Canada visited all provinces on board 
a special train and stopped for an official ceremony of welcome in all major cities of 
the country. Huge crowds gathered along the way for the joyous occasion and a sense 
of overwhelming pride swelled as the royal couple travelled across the vast expanse 
of the land. Never before had Canada attracted so much attention on the part of the 
royal family and in such a momentous time, perhaps on the eve of a world conflict 
that would test the military strength of the British Empire and the Allied nations. 
When the St. Louis crisis began to unfold for Canadian readers, on May 31, the tour 
had reached the Prairies and by then the excitement generated by the passing of the 
royal train knew no bounds. All the more since Prime Minister Mackenzie King was 
constantly at the side of George VI and wished to emphasize by his presence the so-
called national independence of Canada within the British Commonwealth. Without 
interruption almost, in both official languages, Canadian newspapers reported the 
progress of the royal train and adorned their pages with pictures of shy children 
meeting the visiting monarchs with armfuls of flowers. Rarely had a more trium-
phant image of Canada been presented by the national press.32
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It is important to note as well that the genuine excitement surrounding the royal 
tour created a power vacuum at the highest level of government. Mackenzie King 
not only accompanied the royal couple across Canada, but also joined the British 
monarch on May 7 when he began an official diplomatic visit to the United States, 
posing for reasons of protocol as the sole minister in attendance to the King, rather 
than any British minister. In such a context, Mackenzie King was certainly not about 
to have unplanned minor events derail his political agenda.33 When information 
about the St. Louis refugee crisis finally reached him in Niagara Falls on the evening 
of 7 May as he was about to enter the territory of the United States with George VI, 
Mackenzie King dismissed the affair out of hand. Rather, he asked his Undersecre-
tary for External Affairs, O. D. Skelton, to examine the solutions available to Canada 
on legal grounds.34 In real terms, this meant that documenting the situation and pro-
posing possible options fell to Skelton and Director of Immigration Frederick Blair, 
two high level civil servants who had not shown much sympathy in the past for ad-
mitting immigrants outside of the very limited categories already defined since the 
passing of PC 1923-183 order in council.35 This disinterest on the part of Mackenzie 
King, as far as Canada was concerned, would prove fatal to the hopes of the Jewish 
refugees on board the St. Louis.
The crisis finally caught the Prime Minister’s attention when George M. Wrong, 
and 41 other Christian Anglophone signatories of British origins from Toronto, sent 
him a telegram on the evening of 7 June addressing the issue.36 In this cable, Wrong 
suggested that Canada welcome the 900 or so refugees on board the St. Louis, which 
by then was heading back to Europe; since the captain and the passengers’ advo-
cates from the US-based Jewish Joint Distribution Committee had exhausted all 
other options, including landing at an American port. A man of great moral stature, 
Wrong was an ordained Anglican priest and the retired head of the Department of 
History at the University of Toronto. His son, Humphrey Hume Wrong, had been 
the official Canadian representative at the international Évian Conference of July 
1938, during which the diplomats from 32 countries had discussed – with little con-
crete results – the best way to come to the rescue of Jewish refugees being expelled 
from Nazi Germany. Essentially, Wrong, who certainly had read about the tragic 
circumstances of the St. Louis from the Canadian press, or perhaps even from its 
better informed American equivalent, described providing a haven to the harassed 
passengers as a gesture inspired by “Christian charity” and following on the heels of 
the very successful royal tour about to end in the country. The wording of the tele-
gram was entirely non-political and referred to the British sense of national pride: 
As a mark of gratitude to almighty God for the pleasure and gratification which 
have been vouchsafed to Canadian people through the visit their Gracious Maj-
esties King George and Queen Elizabeth and as evidence of the true Christian 
charity of the people of this most fortunate and blessed country we the un-
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dersigned as Christian citizens of Canada respectfully suggest that under the 
powers vested in you as Premier of our country you forthwith offer to the 907 
homeless exiles on board the Hamburg American ship St. Louis Sanctuary in 
Canada.37 
Certainly, Mackenzie King could not remain unconcerned or silent following such an 
appeal emanating from the highest echelons of Anglo-British academic and clerical 
milieus in Toronto. The following morning – from an American office in Maryland 
– he sent a telegram to O. D. Skelton at the External Affairs ministry requesting in-
formation on the advisability of the suggestion presented by Wrong. King’s instruc-
tions read as follows: “Would you please communicate the contents immediately to 
Acting Prime Minister and also to Director of Immigration. Would like to be advised 
immediately as to powers of government to meet suggestions which communication 
[Wrong’s telegram] contain. Please advise colleagues that I would like immediate 
considerations given to suggestion made”. The decision to first consult his high-
est-ranking civil servants, in the absence of the minister responsible for Immigra-
tion, Thomas Crerar, would mean that precious time would be lost while a thorough 
examination of the legal and administrative options were being considered. Blair was 
made aware of the situation on June 8 and exchanged correspondence with Skelton 
the same day. The two men discussed sending a telegram to Mackenzie King pro-
viding some answers on June 9 and probably sent the same day.38 It took a rather 
negative stance on admitting the St. Louis refugees, a perspective that was reinforced 
by the minister of Justice Ernest Lapointe when he voiced his opinion on the affair.39 
By then, the German liner had certainly reached the middle of the Atlantic and its 
captain could not risk waiting for a possible change of heart on the part of the Cana-
dian authorities. Nor was captain Schröder made aware of the fact that the Canadian 
Prime Minister was discussing the fate of his passengers. It was probably at exactly 
this juncture that Mackenzie King ultimately decided not to intervene in favor of the 
St. Louis passengers. 
The crucial question is how much the general Canadian public knew about the dra-
ma unfolding in the middle of the Atlantic Ocean, several hours of navigation from 
the closest Canadian port, and if so, could serious pressure be brought to bear on 
Mackenzie King on the part of concerned citizens living in various regions of the 
country. In other words, had Canadians been outraged by the indifference of their 
government to such a crisis, and had press releases reverberated their demand for 
action, might Mackenzie King and his cabinet have reconsidered their initial re-
sponse during the hours following the fateful evening of June 7? A detailed study of 
three important dailies during a period of about two weeks, from 31 May to 15 June, 
reveals that essentially the plight of the St. Louis refugees did not appear anywhere in 
sufficiently bold coverage to attract the attention of Canadian readers in either of the 
country’s official languages.40 If leading dailies such as The Globe and Mail, La Presse, 
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and Le Devoir remained unconcerned or even uninformed about the possibility that 
Canada might grant asylum to the 908 German Jews seeking refuge on the North 
American Atlantic coast, it is very unlikely that newspapers with a smaller circulation 
could have fared much better. As we will soon see, the St. Louis was never more than 
a minor mention lost in a vast sea of information touching on all aspects of Canadian 
and international affairs.41
For a short while, the drama unfolding in Cuban waters was briefly described in 
the Canadian press, mostly from 31 May to 7 June, and then it was almost totally set 
aside until news of the ship reaching Europe and refugees being offered sanctuary 
in Belgium, Great Britain, France and the Netherlands was reported on 14 June and 
15 June. In between those dates, during the crucial interval when Ottawa was con-
sidering the fate of the St. Louis, no Canadian paper of substance presented its read-
ers any information to the effect that the Mackenzie King government was in fact 
debating, if only administratively, the possibility of making a gesture in favor of the 
German Jewish passengers. Not only was the Prime Minister away from the nation’s 
capital and the even from the country; but the minister responsible for immigration, 
Thomas Crerar, could not be reached for a few days and Parliament remained in 
recess for the summer months.42 Under these conditions, it is hardly surprising that 
no echo of the Canadian activity in this affair would have filtered to the press or to 
journalists, all the more since the file was mostly handled by O. D. Skelton and Fred-
erick Blair, two high-ranking civil servants who were bound by the nature of their 
responsibilities to remain silent. Essentially, Canadian readers were lead to believe 
that the St. Louis was an international incident falling entirely under Cuban jurisdic-
tion and, since the temporary landing permit had been revoked by the authorities 
in Havana, should be resolved in that context alone. No substantial information in 
any major Canadian paper alluded to the tragic circumstances of the Jewish refu-
gees trapped at sea, during the period under study, as being an issue of concern to 
the country. Canadians were thus lead, in both official languages, to read the story 
as a distant occurrence and, with very few exceptions, no journalist or editorialist 
discussed the story as having an impact locally. As far as can be established, the crisis 
passed in Canada’s main press organs in a way unlikely to arouse interest on the part 
of the general public.
Canadian dailies did make mention early on of the American involvement in the St. 
Louis crisis, but mostly because it became known on 31 May that the German refugees 
had hoped to eventually gain entrance in the United States, via the delivery of Cuban 
temporary permits.43 Offers of help and financial guarantees from American Jewish 
organizations would soon follow on 2 June, notably from the National Co-ordinat-
ing Committee for Jewish Refugees in New York.44 On 3 June, The Globe and Mail 
reported that the liner was anchored some short distance from Havana: “In response 
to appeals from powerful influences in the United States who have undertaken to 
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straighten out the situation so the refugees may be landed either in Havana, to await 
immigration under the quota restrictions into the United States, or at some other 
port on the Atlantic ocean”.45 La Presse contained essentially the same information, 
which was that on 2 June: “Le capitaine a annoncé qu’il allait tenter d’obtenir la per-
mission d’arrêter à un autre pays d’Amérique” and on 3 June that : “Il semble que le 
paquebot a interrompu sa traversée [de l’Atlantique] et que de puissantes influences 
américaines tentent d’obtenir soit que les réfugiés du ‘Saint-Louis’ trouvent un asile 
provisoire à Cuba, ou que quelque port du littoral américain les accueille”.46 This was 
very little in the way of helping Canadians to believe that the liner would eventually 
sail some distance past one of their country’s seaports on its return journey to Eu-
rope, or that the refugees’ fate would be brought before the Liberal cabinet.47 That, as 
we know, would happen only on the evening of 7 June, in a most inauspicious manner. 
In the meantime The Globe and Mail wrote on 5 June: “No overtures were made by 
captain Wilhelm [sic] Schröder to land in the country [the United States], but it was 
known that a series of conferences both here and elsewhere were being held during 
Sunday afternoon [June 4th] by American Jewry to try to work out some plan whereby 
the ship might land its human cargo in the Dominican Republic”.48 Much contradic-
tory information circulated in the Canadian press as to the whereabouts of the St. 
Louis after it had left Havana Harbor on 2 June and as to the intentions of its captain, 
adding to the confusion reflected on the pages of most national dailies. Some articles 
sent the liner to the Dominican Republic, where the passengers would be let ashore, 
some saw it return to Cuba where further negotiations were to take place and oth-
ers yet described the plight of similar ships having German Jews on board, such as 
the Monte Olivia in Montevideo and the Orinoco cruising in the Caribbean. La Presse 
reported on 5 June that a large boat, presumed to be the St. Louis: “ A levé l’ancre et 
a fait route vers le sud-est très lentement; il s’est éloigné de 10 milles vers le large, 
près des Keys [of Florida]. À bonne heure ce matin, un gros navire qu’on n’a pu avec 
certitude désigner comme le ‘Saint-Louis’ […] s’est arrêté plus d’une heure devant le 
littoral de Miami, puis s’est éloigné lentement vers le nord”.49
On 6 June, both The Globe and Mail and Le Devoir offered news of the Cuban au-
thorities having finally changed their mind and being ready to accept the German 
refugees under certain conditions: “Les sociétés de secours juives doivent décider 
d’ici midi si elles vont accepter l’offre du gouvernement cubain de recevoir les 907 
réfugiés juifs allemands du ‘Saint-Louis’ dans un camp temporaire sur l’île des Pins 
[Isla de Pinos]”.50 By the time it was printed, the information (which may or may not 
have had any validity) was already outdated and on 7 June all three newspapers de-
clared that the St. Louis “has set her course for Europe” late on the night of June 6. 
While The Globe and Mail announced the event in a 35 word paragraph at the very 
bottom of page 2, La Presse reproduced on page 3 a declaration by Lawrence Ber-
enson, described as a leader of an American refugee aid organization in New York: 
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“Le problème des réfugiés du ‘Saint-Louis’ n’est pas encore résolu. Le paquebot a 
reçu l’ordre de regagner l’Allemagne”.51 Le Devoir goes a little further in explaining 
the situation: “Les 907 réfugiés juifs allemands du ‘Saint-Louis’ ont apparemment 
repris le chemin de l’Allemagne après avoir erré cinq jours durant le long des côtes 
de la Floride pendant que les sociétés de secours juives s’efforçaient de leur obtenir 
le droit de débarquer dans l’île de Cuba”.52 These articles essentially end the coverage, 
in Canadian newspapers, of the story of the St. Louis’ vain attempt to obtain a safe 
haven for its passengers in the American hemisphere. Only Le Devoir alludes on 7 
June to the fact that a message has been sent in extremis to President Roosevelt by 
the refugees asking for his clemency.
In total this represents sixteen articles over eight days (including 7 June), printed 
in three of the country’s leading newspapers; seven by The Globe and Mail, four by 
La Presse, and five by Le Devoir, all of which are minor mentions in rather marginal 
placings on the front page or further down inside.53 As none of these dailies had 
reporters in Cuba while the crisis was unfolding, all three relied on news agencies 
for their information, mostly American firms such as Associated Press and United 
Press International who often relayed human interest stories and poignant episodes; 
such as an attempted suicide in Cuban waters and the emotional reactions of certain 
refugees on learning that they could not be reunited with members of their family 
in Havana. Only one photograph of the events appeared in a Canadian paper; that 
of a Jewish German couple on board the St. Louis about to be separated as the ship 
leaves Havana harbor on June 2, also probably obtained from an American source.54 
Entitled: “Brief Reunion in Havana Has Tearful Ending”, the picture appears in The 
Globe and Mail on 6 June on page 2 of the newspaper. It was hardly enough to attract 
the attention of a Canadian public inundated with pictures of the royal couple tour-
ing in grand fanfare the various regions and cities of the country. On 7 June, as all 
three papers had announced the end of the saga and the sailing of the St. Louis toward 
Europe, The Globe and Mail published an editorial on the subject deploring the treat-
ment metered to the German Jewish exiles by the Cuban government – and not the 
Canadian one. It appears on column 3 of page 6, making it a rather minor issue for 
the paper. It is nonetheless a strong condemnation of the tactics used by the Cuban 
president in withdrawing the visas already awarded a few days earlier, and which 
placed the refugees in a difficult conundrum. The Globe and Mail writes:
Obviously the refugees were duped. Whether or not the Cuban Government is 
solely to blame, it had a large hand in the business. Its responsibility to this ex-
tent was admitted. Inferentially at any rate, in the [Cuban] President’s statement 
on Monday. Having been admitted, the only possible conclusion to be drawn 
from its latest reversal of policy is that the immigrants and the committees ne-
gotiating for them are victims of a holdup racket. If this is not the case, Cuban 
officials should think again and relieve themselves of suspicion.55
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Although The Globe and Mail did acknowledge on 7 June the distress and agony of the 
German Jewish refugees on board the St. Louis, nowhere did the paper allude to the 
possibility that the government of Canada would offer a safe haven to the passengers 
now on their way back to Europe. It is probably this editorial issued in the Toronto 
daily – or news obtained from better-informed American sources – that convinced 
George M. Wrong and 41 other persons to send on that very evening an urgent 
telegram to Mackenzie King requesting action. If the three Canadian newspaper ex-
amined in this study did very little, if nothing at all, to suggest before 7 June that the 
St. Louis be allowed into a Canadian harbor, they did not either bring to their readers 
news of the refusal by the American authorities to welcome the passengers under 
their own jurisdiction. Up to that point, the Canadian dailies had only reported a sit-
uation in which, rejected by Cuba and possibly other Caribbean nations, the captain 
of the liner had no other choice but to sail back to Hamburg. It simply did not appear 
in the Canadian press, in either of the official languages, that the United States and 
Canada were in fact options along the way back to the stateless German exiles. On 
8 June, The Globe and Mail published Wrong’s telegram to Mackenzie King, but it 
is reproduced on page 17, at the bottom of Judith Robinson’s regular column in the 
paper. Next to it is an almost page wide photograph of the King and Queen of Canada 
as they appeared in full regalia at a welcoming ceremony in Brantford, Ontario.
The only Canadian professional newspaper person to discuss the issue of the St. Louis 
in a regular column was Judith Robinson. A journalist with The Globe and Mail, she 
had gained a reputation during the Great Depression for investigative journalism 
and had a deep sense of social justice, often criticizing governments for their in-
difference to the sufferings of the common folk. Robinson was also a vocal adver-
sary of the policy of appeasement pursued by both the British and Canadian Prime 
Ministers concerning the territorial ambitions of Nazi Germany. In her 8 June text, 
she first cited the Wrong telegram in its entirety, as mentioned above, and then 
commented – in contradiction to the feelings of most of her compatriots – that its 
content was “a reminder of a responsibility even more pressing than that of atten-
dance of their Majesties”.56 Christian principles, she insisted, should have convinced 
members of the Mackenzie King cabinet that charity made no distinctions of race 
while the life of human beings were in peril. She then went on to cite the Gospels 
and in particular Mathew 25:40, which in her opinion should have been the guiding 
light in such a predicament as German Jewish refugees found themselves in. In all, 
Robinson’s plea in favor of the St. Louis passengers’ admission to Canada had a length 
of about 300 words, including the entire text of the Wrong telegram and citations 
from the Gospel. It was very little for Canada’s largest newspaper, despite the col-
umnist’s good intentions and the pressing circumstances at hand. In all likelihood, 
very few readers would have dug in deep enough in that day’s Globe and Mail to read 
Robinson’s opinion or to understand the urgency of addressing the situation. 
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The next day, 9 June, across two columns in the middle of page 4, one of the 41 sig-
natories of the Wrong telegram expressed his opinion on the refugee crisis, which 
The Globe and Mail had described up to then as an entirely Caribbean affair taking 
place very far from the seacoast of Canada. On the occasion of a Baptist convention, 
Bishop Robert John Renison, a Toronto Anglican priest and then rector of St. Paul’s 
parish on Bloor St., declared: “Here in Canada, we ought to be helpful and happy, 
but I can’t help but think of that ghost-ship that sails the Atlantic tonight carrying 
nearly 1,000 refugee Jews who came from the Old World toward this land of hope 
and glory and plenty. I think of them with death and suicide in their hearts, return-
ing to the country whence they came”.57 It was three small paragraphs in a sea of 
information on all imaginable subjects, and on a page featuring five photographs of 
young men and women enjoying themselves at a sunny beach in the Toronto area. 
On the front page of The Globe and Mail that day was a large photograph of President 
Franklin D. Roosevelt and George VI approaching the White House in a motorcade, 
part of the royal tour that was now entering in its American segment amidst much 
media attention. Among the official retinue, surrounding the King in Washington 
stood Canada’s Prime Minister, ever at the side of the monarch as a representative 
of his close cabinet of advisors. The tone of the newspaper that day was a far cry 
from a serious exploration of the fate of German Jewish refugees in the world. On 
the contrary, as one of its editorialists admitted, The Globe and Mail, had been rather 
happy to concentrate on the frivolities of a royal diplomatic mission being conducted 
throughout North America, rather than report on the menacing situation in Europe:
Not the least benefit derived from the Canadian tour of their Majesties has been 
its effect in driving the swaggering dictators off the front page. This newspaper 
admits frankly that it has been guilty, along with others, of overplaying the ges-
tures of the mountebanks and unconsciously helping them to spread the jitters. 
[…] Now it is up to us to take things in hand. We have reason to consider the dic-
tator’s balloon pricked. Their importance is relegated to the background. Let us 
keep it there until we find real cause for alarm and without relaxing safeguards, 
get on with the pressing business of making this domain of their Majesties more 
worthy of their sovereignty.58
If the threat of a world conflict had receded briefly in the early summer of 1939, at 
least on the front pages of Canadian papers, sending victims of Nazism back to Eu-
rope on board a luxury liner was certainly not going to trouble the conscience of lo-
cal politicians and editorialists.59 On 10 June, La Presse reported that the passengers of 
the St. Louis were still waiting for a resolution of the diplomatic impasse and that the 
boat was moving away from the coast of North America “à petite vapeur”.60 This, the 
readers could learn from an United Press dispatch, was while negotiations were tak-
ing place between Robert T. Pell, assistant chief of the Division of European Affairs of 
the American Secretary of State and four European governments. La Presse went on 
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to note that other passenger ships with German Jewish refugees on board – such as 
the Orazio, an Italian vessel, and the Orduna, a British one, bound for the Chilean port 
of Arica – were also experiencing great difficulties in finding South American ports 
willing to welcome their stateless passengers.61 La Presse was the only one of the three 
newspapers that followed the situation of the St. Louis in any detail after 8 June, but it 
did so without mentioning that the government of Canada had been called upon by 
some of its own citizens to offer a solution to the refugee’s ordeal. More likely than 
not, La Presse, a French language press organ, was not informed of such a possibility 
and had not obtained a copy of the Wrong telegram of 7 June.
The crisis came to an end on 14 June when a release from the American Press agency 
revealed that Britain, France, Belgium, and The Netherlands would share the re-
sponsibility of welcoming the passengers of the St. Louis on their soil. Apparently, 
efforts on the part of the American Secretary of State and Jewish American relief 
organizations had finally borne fruit. The Globe and Mail offered the news with no 
reference to the fact that the Canadian government had washed its hand of the fate 
of the refugees a few days earlier. The paper cited only the intervention of the Amer-
ican Joint Distribution Committee in offering a bond for each of the passengers 
on the liner “as a guarantee that the refugees would not become public charges of 
the nations giving them temporary homes”.62 The articles conveying this information 
were minor mentions easily lost to the distracted reader on a front page featuring, 
on 14 June, the visit of the royal couple to New Brunswick and announcing news 
of the Japanese blockade of British and French concessions in Shanghai. La Presse 
and Le Devoir followed suit the same day with even smaller size articles buried deep 
into the pages of the French language dailies, both using American sources and not 
mentioning a Canadian involvement.63 Altogether, the three newspapers under study 
offered 23 news mentions of the St. Louis crisis over 16 days, from 31 May to 15 June, 
ten in the Globe and Mail, seven in La Presse and six in Le Devoir. Among them were 
twelve first page placements, mostly in The Globe and Mail, but not in a bold type 
susceptible to attract the immediate attention of most readers. 
On 15 June, while the ill-fated passengers of the St. Louis had not yet set foot in 
Antwerp, The Globe and Mail published an editorial entitled “Immigration Means 
Employment”, arguing that Canada had been too prejudiced or too narrow-minded 
to consider admitting men with abilities to contribute to the country’s prosperity.64 
If Canada was to develop economically, proposed the Toronto newspaper, it must 
consider the advantages brought by the immigrants, such as an enlarged consumer 
market and increased domestic production, even in time of high employment: 
Increased production, whether it be of farm or factory, means work. This leads 
to another, the most important, feature of the immigration question we seem to 
have overlooked. Many of the people now seeking escape from Central Europe 
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are highly skilled artisans. Many are distinguished in science, the arts, technol-
ogy and commerce. Such people have a contribution to make wherever they are. 
Men with the courage to sacrifice home and all it implies sooner than conform 
to the autocratic mould [sic] are of the stuff of which democracy is made, the 
same stuff that colonized and pioneered this country.65
Upon close reading, the editorial of 15 June indirectly brings to light a serious dis-
connect between the events taking place in Cuba in the first few days of June, mainly 
the St. Louis affair, and the wider perception that The Globe and Mail held of inter-
national immigration; this at a time when large numbers of European citizens were 
being displaced by Nazi brutality. As Amanda Grzyb’s study of English language 
Canadian newspapers between September 1938 and August 1939 reveals, editorialists 
and journalists were quite willing to show sympathy for the German Jewish victims 
of the Third Reich around the time of Kristallnacht.66 They were much less adamant 
though, a few months later, about considering the admission of these individuals in 
large numbers within the country’s border. As we saw, The Globe and Mail was ready 
to report in early June on the tribulations of a ship filled with close to a thousand 
German Jewish refugees, cruising in close proximity with the Canadian coast, but 
ignored the incident entirely when addressing a week later the issue of a possible 
beneficial immigration of “highly skilled” Central Europeans to the country. 
As it was, hundreds of such candidates, all of Jewish origins, had just sailed at some 
distance past the Maritime Provinces on board the St. Louis without attracting the at-
tention of Canadian journalists or publicists as prospective immigrants, despite their 
tragic situation. At no point did The Globe and Mail remind its readers in early June, 
as it would have been reasonable in the circumstances, that indeed here was a group 
of people whose profile came close to the desirable one about to be presented a few 
days later in the “Immigration Means Employment” editorial. The Globe and Mail 
went even further on 15 June, denouncing with strong words the apathy of Canadians 
to the advantages of welcoming new citizens. This shortsighted attitude, the edito-
rialist mused, was due entirely to the anti-immigrant prejudice found rampant in 
Canadian public opinion: “Surely no one in Canada will argue that we have no need 
of and no place for enterprise of this kind. But that is, in effect, what our immigra-
tion phobia suggests”.67 From this we must conclude that the Toronto paper had only 
expressed empathy for the St. Louis passengers on an abstract and moral plane, but 
was not ready to consider in practical terms German Jews as acceptable candidates 
for immigration, even when they were experiencing close to the Canadian border 
an insensitive treatment on the part of Cuban and American authorities. In fact, it 
must be admitted that such a disengagement of the Canadian press from pressing 
refugee situations is quite typical of the immediate pre-war period. That was also 
the judgement passed by Mackenzie King and his close advisors when they refused, 
behind closed doors, to become involved in the St. Louis affair.
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What would have happened had Canadian public opinion, in both official languages, 
been made aware in clear terms of the possibility of a Canadian rescue of the St. Louis 
passengers between 8 June and 10 June? That would have been while the ship was 
still close enough to the North American coast to change direction. Could popular 
pressure or perhaps even public indignation on the part of a large number of citizens 
have forced Ottawa to reconsider its initially negative decision? Even after more than 
eighty years, such a resolution of the St. Louis crisis remains highly speculative. There 
were very few precious hours between the sending of the Wrong telegram and the 
decision made by the captain to finally head back to Europe, still unaware of the 
possibility of a Canadian welcome. Why did The Globe and Mail, and other Canadian 
papers, neglect to report or perhaps choose to ignore the Canadian side of the affair? 
Was it for lack of information or because of a shameful inclination to reject outright 
“non-preferred” Jewish immigrants? All that can be confirmed, with some certainty, 
is that there was no substantial coverage of the affair in the Canadian press, both in 
English and in French at the crucial time when the St. Louis was leaving Cuba with 
almost all its initial passengers. Even the distant possibility of a Canadian solution 
to the crisis was not discussed by any editorialist or journalist after 7 June, save one. 
If Canada was guilty in this instance of an inhumane treatment of refugees, it was 
essentially because its mostly Anglophone political elite refused to address the issue 
openly and squarely in public. 
There was also no intention on the part of the federal government, on the eve of the 
Second World War, to modify or even marginally alter a series of rules and regula-
tions regarding immigration that had been in force since at least the turn of the cen-
tury. These laws and administrative measures defined Canada as a “white dominion” 
composed of people of British stock or Nordic European origins. In this perspective, 
all other groups were deemed unacceptable or undesirable, with the possible ex-
ception in the late nineteenth century of farming communities considered sturdy 
enough to resist the harsh conditions existing in the unsettled Canadian West. No 
sufficient amount of political pressure could be brought forward in the late thirties, 
even by bona fide Anglo-British defenders of the European refugees of Nazism, 
to change the original racist overtones Canada’s immigration policies. On this is-
sue, there was certainly a large consensus, among the Anglophone and Francophone 
population of Canada that precluded admitting individuals of other ethnic stock un-
der any circumstance, except on a one-to-one basis. That, essentially, was the larger 
obstacle that lay in the way of acceptance for the St. Louis passengers in June 1939, not 
merely antisemitism or social disdain for German Jews fleeing political persecution. 
It was, on all counts, a formidable ideological barrier that would not be removed in 
Canada until much later after the war, when British colonial notions of racial purity 
gradually ebbed in favor of a multicultural approach to citizenship. 
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Another issue that we have to grapple with in this instance is the inability on the 
part of Canadian elites, both Anglophone and Francophone, to perceive in all its 
consequences the violent and inhuman character of the racial policies applied in the 
Reich, especially against Jews. The mass murder of entire populations and the forced 
displacement of certain categories of individuals, with all the attendant sufferings, 
humiliations and material destructions, are realities that Canadians could simply not 
imagine being conducted on such a scale as was about to be implemented in Central 
and Eastern Europe. Most citizens of Canada had not followed events in Germany 
with much attention, and saw no reason to oppose sending back victims of Nazi per-
secutions in what appeared to be safe havens on that continent. Who could foresee 
in the summer of 1939 that France, Belgium and the Netherlands would be occupied 
a year later by a German military force, and that Great Britain would be under the 
threat of a pending invasion? All in all these reasons would lead to a failure on the 
part of Canada to provide a credible and humanitarian answer to a crisis taking place 
at the country’s doorstep. On the rare occurrence when immigrants tried to force 
their way into a Canadian port – as in the case of the Komagata Maru in Vancouver 
in 1914 – authorities had always stood firm and pushed the intruders away. Canada’s 
immigration policies had not been designed to react to emergencies and crisis sit-
uations, but to stem the long-term flow of undesirables right from the start, before 
they began their journey. As the St. Louis affair would demonstrate, the country was 
not at all prepared in June 1939 to react to the new conditions under which immigra-
tion would soon take place, in a world torn by military conflicts and genocidal im-
pulses. Canadians, both French and English speaking, had deep isolationist reflexes 
and did not for the most part perceive the storm clouds of the Second World War 
coming towards them in the distance. 
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